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Abstract: In one form or another, the phenomena associated with “meaning transfer” become central 
issues in a lot of recent work on semantics. This study is our contribution towards clarifying the 
expression “The Meaning of Life” in the proceedings of the 2010 Literary Society of Nigeria (LSN) 
Annual Conference. Our modus operandi for that set objective is to elucidate the formulation the 
meaning of life in the conference”s theme and sub-themes, by examining incisively the notion of 
meaning within the said formulation. Our interest in meaning is rooted in semantics, an academic 
discipline universally defined as “the study of meaning”. Our intellectual tools for the analysis are (i) 
the symbolist theory of meaning, attributable to Ogen & Richards (1923), as well as to Lyons (1981 
& 1995); (ii) the performative theory of meaning in Uwajeh (1996b, 1996c, 2002 & 2010); and (iii) 
the subjective well-being theory of meaning, in Diener, Lucas & Oishi (2002). The overall thrust of 
our argumentation shows up through our confronting the meaning in the 2010 LSN Annual 
conference”s “The Meaning of Life” with the meaning in “The Study of Meaning” of semantics.  




Those who study the meaning of life have argued that people seek to build meaning 
in their lives, defend it from threats and repair it from damage (e.g. Battista & 
Almond, 1973; Reker & Wong, 1988; Steger & Frazier, 2005; Steger, Frazier, Oish 
& Kaler, 2006; Steger, 2009; 2012). Scholars have Sought to articulate the kinds of 
meaning people experience at varying levels of abstraction- from the meaning of 
words to the meaning of “life, the universe, and everything” (Park, 2010; Uwajeh, 
2010; Steger, 2012). “The Meaning of Life” is undoubtedly of great consequence 
in the proceedings of the 2010 LSN Annual Conference. The formulation is a 
critical component of the conference’s theme, “Literature as an Inquiry into the 
Meaning of Life”; and it is also an integral constituent of the conference’s seven 
sub-themes as follows:  
(i) Language as an Inquiry into the Meaning of Life;  
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(ii) Poetry as an Inquiry into the Meaning of Life; 
(iii) Prose as an Inquiry into the Meaning of Life; 
(iv) Drama as an Inquiry into the Meaning of Life; 
(v) Oral Literature a s an Inquiry into the Meaning of Life; 
(vi) Film/Home Videos as an Inquiry into the Meaning of Life;  
(vii) Theatre as an Inquiry into the Meaning of Life.  
Within the intellectual background just specified, this paper is our contribution 
towards an enhanced appreciation of the conference’s theme and sub-themes. Our 
set objective here is to examine incisively the notion of meaning within the said 
formulation. Our interest in meaning is rooted in semantics, an academic discipline 
universally defined as “the study of meaning”. However, the definition of 
semantics has generally been quite uncontroversial since the inception of the 
discipline as a self- contained field of intellectual inquiry, what exactly to 
understand by “meaning” in that definition remains definitely controversial to date-
rendering semantics the most confused and confusing academic discipline indeed! 
In one of the several different interpretations of “meaning” in semantics, meaning 
is purportedly any instance of whatever the word “meaning” is used to refer to in 
the context of any given linguistic formulation. It is especially the semantic 
doctrine of this school of thought in semantics that we wish to confront in this 
paper, in order to clarify the formulation “the meaning of life” in the 2010 LSN 
Annual conference’s theme and sub-themes. Specifically, we wish to determine to 
what extent, if at all, “meaning” in “the meaning of Life” comes within the purview 
of semantics defined as “the study of meaning.”  
 
Theoretical Framework and Review of Related Literature 
“Symbolist”, as used in this paper, is derived from the term “Symbol”, which term 
may be technically defined as the general name for a form unit used to refers to any 
one thing whatsoever- whether the thing is concrete or abstract, real or imaginary, 
etc. therefore, every word of a language, for example, is a kind of symbol. As 
should be self-evident from our presentation so far, in a symbolist theory of 
meaning, the focus of the theory is manifestly on the word itself “meaning” 
wherever that symbol occurs, and not on what the word expresses as much; hence 
the appellatation symbolist for the theory. Semantics is defined as “the study of 
meaning”, “meaning is anything called “meaning”; and there is hence purportedly 
not just one phenomenon being referred to with “meaning” in the definition. For 
Ogden and Richards (1923) and Lyons (1981 & 1995), therefore, to say that 
semantics is the study of meaning is equivalent to saying that semantics is the study 
of several different (kinds of) phenomena, each of which is called “meaning”.  
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We use the expression “symbolist theory” for any serious claim as to what meaning 
is which endorses the above position that several different (kinds of) phenomena, 
not just one phenomenon, are referred to by “meaning” when semantics is defined 
as “the study of meaning”; and “symbolist theorists” are, for us, all scholars who 
seriously spouse that said symbolist theory position about what meaning is. 
According to our explanations in this paragraph, Ogben and Richards (1923) and 
Lyons 91981 & 1995) is symbolist theorist of meaning. In addition, Umagandhi 
and Vinothini (2017) add that semantics is also central to the study of 
communication. Though the “meaning” or the information one wants to 
communicate can be conveyed through a number of means like gesture, picture, 
signals, etc. Language was the main tool of communication of the human beings. 
Semantics as a branch of linguistics was mainly concerned with how the 
“meaning” was conveyed by the linguistics system considering of different unit 
structures like sentence, phrases, words, morphemes, etc.  
Consider the following sentences, extracted from Rosenberg and Travis (1971, p. 
397), for an illustration of how the symbolist theory of meaning works. 
1. Her expression last Friday was full of meaning.  
2. She meant well.  
3. There is much meaningless formality in everyday life.  
4. These clouds mean rain.  
5. Your friendship means much to me.  
6. I meant her to say. 
7. The superstitious ascribe meaning to the purest accident.  
8. In the light of this information the incident acquires a fresh meaning.  
9. These two words have the same meaning.  
According to symbolist theorists, semantics is not just the study of what “meaning” 
refers to in sentence 1,7,8 and 9 above, but also to what the derivatives of 
“meaning” such as “meant” in sentence 2, “meaningless” in sentence 3, “mean” in 
sentence 4, and “means” in sentence 5. Now, let us attempt to specify the several 
different things referred to with “meaning” and its derivatives in the said nine 
sentence examples above. Take sentence 1, for illustration.  
1. Her expression last Friday was full of meaning 
Here, “meaning” obviously refers to some emotional state which 
somebody”s expression made manifest the preceding Friday.  
2. She meant well.  
Here, “meant” obviously refers to the past intending of something by 
somebody 
3. There is much meaningless formality in everyday life.  
“Meaningless” in sentence 3 refers to some useless quality of formality.  
4. These clouds mean rain.  
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“Mean” in sentence 4 refers to the present activity of signaling which may 
be deduced from the appearance of the clouds in question.  
5. Your friendship means much to mean  
“Means” in sentence 5 refers to the present activity of having value which 
the addressee’s friendship exhibits for the sentence- constructor.  
6. I meant her to stay.  
“Meant” in sentence 6 refers to the past activity of planning by the 
sentence- constructor.  
7. The superstitious ascribe meaning to the purest accident  
Here, “meaning” refers to the significance which the superstitious manage 
to discover even in “the purest accident”.  
8. In the light of this information the incident acquires a fresh meaning.  
Here, “meaning” refers to another, different, interpretation which some 
information just received calls for about some past incident. 
9. These two words have the same meaning.  
Here, “meaning” refers to something expressed by the two words as 
linguistic forms, in a specific linguistic communication- according to the 
intention of the particular communicator, and the understanding of the 
targeted communicatee.  
For symbolist theorists, then, when semantics is defined as “the study of meaning”, 
the meaning in question for study according to the definition is not only each of the 
ostensibly different phenomena referred to with “meaning” in sentence 1 (i.e., 
emotional state), sentence 7 (i.e., significance), sentence 8 (i.e., interpretation), and 
sentence 9 (i.e., something expressed with linguistic forms), but also each of the 
ostensibly different phenomena referred to with the derivatives of “meaning” that 
is, past intending referred to with “meant” in sentence 2, useless quality referred to 
with “meaningless” in sentence 3, present activity of signaling referred to with 
“mean” in sentence present activity of having value referred to with “means” in 
sentence 5, and past activity of planning referred to with “meant” in sentence 6. So, 
given the foregoing, does the meaning in the meaning of Life” of the 2010 LSN 
Annual Conference theme and sub-themes come within the purview of semantics, 
defined as “the study of meaning”? According to the symbolist theory of meaning, 
since in that semantic theory, “meaning” is any called “meaning” in “the meaning 
of Life” should definitely be a preoccupation of semantics; according to our present 
understanding of the issues involved, the symbolist theory of meaning is, ab initio, 
Not a tenable basis for determining whether or not meaning in the meaning of Life” 
comes within the purview of semantics because theory is hopelessly flawed in its 
central tenet, that “meaning” is anything called “meaning” Put slightly differently, 
the symbolist semantics theory, in our estimation, is a very bad semantic theory for 
the conduct of semantics because it undermines with its central tenet the very basis 
of semantics as an academic discipline in two critical ways.  
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First, with its fundamental postulate that there is Not any one particular object 
(called “meaning”) which semantics is the study of the symbolist theory of 
meaning in effect rejects “the presupposition of existence” of meaning, according 
to Lyons (1981)-i.e., the presupposition that there is something called “meaning”, 
when it is said that semantics is “the study of meaning”. In so doing, the symbolist 
semantics theory implies that semantics does not have its own ONE subject matter 
(called “meaning”) when it is defined as “the study of meaning”! Now, as every 
serious scholar knows, each academic discipline in question; for example, 
linguistics is the study of something, called “language”; physics is the study of 
something, called “matter”; sociology is the study of something, called “society”; 
psychology is the study of something, called “behavior”; Anthropology is the 
study of something, called “culture”; etc. so, if, according to the symbolist semantic 
theory, there is purportedly no ONE phenomenon as such, called “meaning”, 
which semantics studies, when it is defined as “the study of meaning”, it follows 
that the conduct of semantics should be an exercise in futility for scholars so 
engaged! The central tenet of the symbolist theory of meaning, as we have just 
presented it, is thus an example par excellence of certain contradictions in 
semantics which repeatedly provoke the exasperation of its long-suffering students 
(Uwajeh, 1996; 2002; 2005; 2008).  
Second, given that any attempt to use the symbolist theory of meaning, invariably 
reveals that there is indeed No one entity common to the several different (kinds of) 
phenomena referred with “meaning” or any of its derivatives when semantics is 
defined as “the study of meaning”, it follows that the symbolist theory is in fact in 
denial of “the presupposition of homogeneity”, according to Lyons (1981), about 
something called “meaning” which should be common to all the usages of the term 
“meaning” and all its derivatives for “the study of meaning” known as “semantics”. 
Thus, there is clearly nothing in common between (1) emotional state; (2) activity 
of intending; (3) useless quality; (4) present activity of signaling; (5) present 
activity of having value; (6) past activity of planning; (7) significance; (8) 
interpretation; and (9) something expressed with linguistic forms. Therefore, 1 to 9 
above would refers to so, if, as claimed in the symbolist theory of meaning, there 
were really nothing common between the several different things referred to with 
“meaning” (and its derivatives) when it is said that semantics is the study of 
meaning”, then it should follow that semantics so conducted would become an 
impossible academic discipline-given that such a semantic is in effect studying 
several different and unrelated phenomena, from which inherently unfocused study 
no Coherent significant knowledge could ever be attained (Uwajeh, 1996c).  
Admitted, then, that the symbolist theory of meaning is definitely NOT a viable 
basis for determining whether or not meaning in “the meaning of life” of the 2010 
LSN Annual Conference theme and sub-themes comes within the purview of 
Semantics defined as “the study of meaning”, because the theory is hopelessly 
flawed in its central tenet that “meaning is anything called “meaning”, does 
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meaning in the meaning of life constitute a problem for Semantics by the defining 
tenet of any other, non-symbolist theory of meaning? We answer this question by 
examining what meaning is in performative theory of meaning.  
 
The Performative Theory of Meaning  
The performative theory of meaning is itself an integral part of linguistic theory in 
Performative Linguistics. The linquistive theory of performative linguistics is 
described in some detail in Uwajeh (2002), Beyond Generative Grammar: A course 
in Performative Linguistics, as well as in the Second, Revised Edition of the same 
book (Uwajeh, 2010). The bedrock postulate of “performativism”-in other words, 
of the performative linguistics, linguistic theory paradigm is that “Language is an 
intelligent performance”, where the term “performance” is used in the special 
technical sense to posit Language as “something performed” (i.e., NOT the 
performing activity itself which gives rise to language, according to how 
“performance” has hitherto been more commonly understood since Chomsky’s 
1965 Aspects of the theory of syntax). Thus, Language is “something performed” 
with due regard for the communication exigencies of real life such that any realist 
characterization of Language must also take into account those same 
communication constraints which make Language texts (i.e, actual Language units) 
bona fide communicative constructs of Language users (Uwajeh, 1994).  
“performative Grammar”, is a context-sensitive characterization of Language 
structure which derives from the tenets of performative linguistics. Also, derived 
of translation paradigm called “performative Translatology”, as outlined in 
particular in Uwajeh (1994) “The case for a Performative Translatology”; and as 
worked out exhaustively in Uwajeh (2007) Translation Equivalence: An Essay in 
Theoretical Linguistics. In some detail, the linguistic theory upon which the 
performative theory of meaning is constructed is made manifest in the five cardinal 
tenets of performativism, as follows.  
One, the nature of Language is not just a matter of Language structure, but also 
inherently concerns issues of language use. The fact that Language is essentially a 
communication tool, for instance, is of enormous importance in the 
characterization of Language; yet, the communicative character of Language in 
certainly not part of Language structure. Therefore, it is scientifically perverse to 
assume that the structure of Language alone can constitute all there is to know 
which is significant about the nature of Language as erroneously stated and 
defended in Chomsky’s (1975) reflections on Language especially, among other 
academic works. 
Two, Language content comprises TWO, and only TWO, major constituents-in 
agreement with the Ferdinand de Saussure’s bicomponential model of Language 
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make-up. The two major components of Language content or make-up are its 





Figure 1. The Performative Linguistic Bicomponential Model of Language 
The componentiality of Language, in terms of the two essences of thought or 
“meaning” and symbolization or “form”, may thus be gainfully used to set 
performative Linguistics apart from other paradigms of Linguistics as state 
hereunder.  
First, Performative Lingustics rejects the traditional Grammar and structuralist 
Linguistics School monocomponential model of Language which is used by Fries 
(1952) for example to build his modern linguistic theory, whereby Language is 
supposedly only meaningful form –is that, being such an intrinsic essence of 
Language as recognized by Linguistics Departments academic programmes 
worldwide which routinely consider the scientific study of linguistic meaning (i.e., 
Semantics in Linguistics) to be a core Linguistics course, meaning is definitely an 





Figure 2. Structuralist Lingustics Monocomponential Model of Language  
Performative also rejects Generative Gramar’s tricompoential model of Language 
first formulated in Chomsky (1965), and illustrated in figures 3 below, whereby 
Language supposedly comprises (i) form, (ii) meaning, and (iii) syntax. The basis 
for the rejection is that the so-called “syntax” third major component of Language 
is fictitious (and hence non- existent) – given that syntax is part of the form 
component of Language, and NOT a third major constituent as such, if we use the 
universally accepted notion of “syntax” a s concerning supralexical (i.e., above-
lexical-level) formal structure of Language.  
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Figure 3. The Generative Grammar Tricomponential Model of Language 
The “Meaning-Structure Grammar’s zerocomponential model of Language 
proposed in Chafe (1970) and illustrated in figure 4 below, whereby Language is 
some kind of “Link” between sound and meaning (i.e., where Language is neither 
meaning nor form nor both meaning and form) is also rejected by performativist 
linguistic theory. The basis for the rejection is that a characterization of Language 
wherein Language consists of neither form or meaning, nor both form and 
meaning, but in which characterization meaning is explicitly identified to be of 
crucial importance for the character of Language make -up and for the nature of 






Figure 4. The Meaning-Structure Grammer Zerocomponential Model of Language  
Three, Language, as a communication means necessarily is also essentially a 
representational phenomenon. Its representational character is what distinguishes 
Language from other (Non-Linguistic) means of communication, which are 
essentially indication in nature. Language as a representational means of 
communication inherently, stands for (and thereby expresses directly) various 
realities which preoccupy our consciousness, whereby the communicator makes the 
communicatee also aware of those realities as information intended by that 
communicator. When, for example, a casher tells a customer “queue up, please!”, 
the customer knows, by virtue of the conventional code (called English) which 
he/she has learned, exactly what information the casher intended for him/her, 
which the casher’s spoken text “Queue up, please!” is supposed to call up for or 
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with respect to the realities it is used to communicate, but also the two main 
components of Language (i.e., Language though and Language symbolization), are 
themselves representational with respect to the relationship between them. Thus, 
the relationship between Language though or “meaning” and Language 
symbolization or “form” is representational: Language thought is the 
“represented”, and Language symbolization is the “representer”. 
Non – linguistic means of communication, as indication means, point to (and 
thereby express indirectly) various realities which preoccupy our consciousness, 
whereby the communicator makes the communicatee also aware of those realities 
as information intended by that communicator. If, for instance, your visiting new 
neighbour has been in your house too late into the night for your linking, you could 
deliberately yawn rather explosively such that your neighbour gets the hint about 
the information conveyed in the context, when he/she deduces that you must be 
feeling very sleepy to have yawned so uncontrollably, and that he/she should 
therefore terminate his/her visit immediately; which conclusion you of course 
intended all along and indicated (i.e., “pointed to” or expressed indirectly) as 
information with your dramatic yawning. Although, language is essentially 
representational in nature, it could also in addition to (NOT instead of) being 
representational also is indicational as a means of communication. For instance, if, 
instead of yawning explicatively, as presented above, you adroitly slip into your 
conversation with your new neighbour the statement “I hate keeping awake late 
into the night”, you could thereby not only be representing information about your 
sleeping habits but also be indicating thereby in addition that your new neighbour 
should end his/her visit immediately so that you can go to sleep.  
Four, all Language symbolization types are equal a s media for representing 
thought or “meaning” whereby Linguistic theory in Performative Linguistic rejects 
the “primacy of speech principle” in modern Linguistics1, that speech (i.e., spoken 
Language) is somehow supposedly primary in the nature of Language. In other 
words, for performativism no Language symbolization type is inherently more or 
less important than another Language symbolization type. In particular, Language 
is, by its nature, neither necessarily nor essentially spoken; and it is hence a serious 
error to treat written and “sign” Languages as if they were mere derivations of 
spoken Language. The true picture is that each language medium has certain 
inherent strengths, but also certain inherent weaknesses, depending on which 
specific (types of) communication situation is involved. Thus, spoken Language 
may indeed admittedly be quicker for the construction of texts than written 
Language, but by its very nature, spoken Language is accordingly more liable to 
the time-constraint-factor errors and slips that are relatively less common in written 
Language, where there is considerably more time for the communicator’s revisions 
and corrections of his/her texts before the texts” delivery to the communicatee. 
                                                        
1 See (Lyons, 1981 for a defence of the principle and Uwajeh, 2002 & 2010 for its repudiation). 
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Five, for performative Linguistics, pragmatic considerations are not just important, 
but are in fact indispensable for the characterization of Language structure. Put 
differently, it follows that a correct Grammar, or satisfactory characterization of 
Language structure, is impossible without a sound pragmatics, or satisfactory 
characterization of Language use. In other words, Language structure is anchored 
in Language use; and Grammar is therefore pragmatics-bound (Uwajeh, 2008; 
2011). 
 
Meaning in the Subjective Well-Being Theory of Meaning 
Semantics as a study of meaning, which relates language to the various aspects of 
non-linguistics reality, was also of interest to various disciplines such as 
philosophy, anthropology, psychology, communication theory, etc. Semantics in 
the broad sense of the term can be considered as the study of all that was 
communicated by Language, but some scholars would like to restrict semantics to 
the study of logical or conceptual “meaning” (i.e., only those aspects of meaning 
which are logically acceptable leaving out deviation and abnormalities). 
Psychologists have argued that “meaning” is making sense of life (Battista & 
Almond, 1973), and also that there is an affective quality to meaning (Reker & 
Wong, 1988); that meaning is primarily nurtured by goal-directed behaviour 
(Lomher, 1977; Ryff & Singer, 1998; Steger, 2012); that meaning is linked to 
transcendent or spiritual concerns (Emmons, 2013; Mascarro, Rosen & Morey, 
2004; Santos, Magramo, Oguan, Paat & Barnachea, 2012); or that meaning comes 
from a sense of self-worth, efficacy, self-justification, and purpose (Baumeister, 
1991; Steger, Kashden & Oishi, 2008). Diener et al. (2002) defined subjective 
well-being as a person’s cognitive and affective evaluation of his or his life. The 
affective element in the context of this paper refers to emotions, moods, and 
feelings. What is important to understand is that “meaning” of “life” is thought as a 
variable that provides the conditions from which affection arises (Lent, 2004) and 
may contribute to the foundation of overall happiness which in turn is subjective 
well-being. “Subjective well-being” can be expressed in simple terms like saying 
oftenly, “I feel good” and “I feel happy”.  
The presentation above is breaking down into social and affective meaning in 
Semantics. These two meaning are concerned with two aspects of communication 
which are derived from the situation or environment in which an utterance or 
sentence was produced in a Language. Of these two, Social meaning was that 
information which a piece of Language (i.e., a pronunciation variation, a word, 
phrase, sentence, etc), conveys about the social circumstance of its use. Social 
“meaning” was understood through the recognition of different dimension and 
level of style within the same Language. Aspects of Language variation like social 
or regional dialect variation, style variation like formal, informal, colloquial, slang, 
etc., in a social situation a functional meaning of a sentence may differ from its 
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conceptual meaning due to its illocutionary force. On the other hand, affective 
meaning is the aspects of meaning which “reflect personal feelings” of the 
communicator, includes the attitude of the communicatee.  
Meanings are thought according to the performative semantic theory and subjective 
well – being theory of meaning ; that is, meanings are abstract entities in the mind-
mental abstractions, in other words Serale (1983) posits that meanings are not only 
Linguistic, but may also be non – Linguistic. All meanings, whether linguistic or 
non- linguistic, are thoughts in the minds of users of forms which thoughts are 
expressed by those forms. Linguistic meaning is one component of a linguistic unit, 
the other component being the corresponding linguistic form; and the relationship 
between the two linguistic components is representational. Therefore, meanings 
are thoughts expressed by forms – with a representational relationship existing 
between each linguistic form and its corresponding linguistic meaning.  
Now to establish the exact ontological status of the meaning referred to within the 
formulation “the meaning of life” of the 2010 LSN Annual Conference theme and 
sub-themes. Clearly, the meaning referred to within the said formulation “the 
meaning of life” is not the same as that referred to within another apparently 
related but quite different formulation “the meaning of life”. In the batter situation, 
the meaning referred to with “meaning” may be quite correctly presented as the 
thought expressed by the form (i.e., the word) “Life”, in the former situation 
regarding “the meaning of life” of the 2010 LNC Annual Conference theme and 
sub- themes, the meaning referred to with “meaning” may be rightly paraphrased 
as the purpose or ultimate goal or existential value of the reality referred to with 
“life”. So, given the presentation above, it is the case for performative Linguistics 
Linguistic theory that the meaning in “the meaning of life” of the 2010 LSN 
Annual Conference theme and sub-themes does constitute the kind of subject 
matter studied by semantics, defined as “the study of meaning”? Our answer is 
“no” and we posit that the performative theory of meaning is the semantic 
component of performative Linguistics linguistic theory, which establishes the 
nature of linguistic meaning.  
 
Conclusion  
Our modus operandi for this study is to confront a pernicious intellectual tradition 
whereby many scholars routinely assume that wherever and whenever the language 
unit “meaning” is involved, then semantics, defined as “the study meaning”, is not 
far away or in other words, that semantics must somehow have something to do 
with every situation of the occurrence of the Language unit “meaning”. We have 
thus far argued that the Language unit “meaning”, besides legitimately referring 
indeed to the subject matter of semantics defined as “the meaning of life”, may 
actually also refer to all kinds of other phenomena that have absolutely nothing to 
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do with the conduct of semantics as an academic discipline. We have used this 
study of the “meaning” in the formulation “the meaning of life” of the 2010 LSN 
Annual Conference theme and sub-themes to underscore our aforementioned 
intellectual concern. 
Whit what “meaning” refers to their properly interpreted, therefore, the formulation 
“the meaning of life” of the 2010 LSN Annual Conference theme and sub-themes 
should be understood as something like “the existential value of life” such that the 
theme and sub-themes may be paraphrased accordingly as follows:  
(i) Literature as an Inquiry into the Existential Value of Life;  
(ii) Language as an Inquiry into the Existential Value of Life; 
(iii) Poetry as an Inquiry into the existential Value of Life;  
(iv) Prose as an Inquiry into the Existential Value of Life; 
(v) Drama as an Inquiry into the existential Value of Life;  
(vi) Oral literature as an Inquiry into the existential Value of Life; 
(vii) Film/ Home videos as an Inquiry into the existential Value of Life; 
(viii) Theatre as an Inquiry into the existential Value of Life. 
Given the foregoing, proper interpretation of “meaning” in the formulation “the 
meaning of life”, it becomes crystal clear that the 2010 LSN Annual Conference is 
in fact preoccupied with investigating, through art, a philosophical problem about 
life. Since that philosophical problem is definitely not a concern of Semantics 
properly understood as the academic discipline which studies thoughts expressed 
with forms, it follows that the meaning with which the 2010 LSN Annual 
Conference theme and sub-themes preoccupied in the formulation “the meaning of 
life”, most laudable as it indeed is, falls outside the purview of Semantics, 
universally defined as “the study of meaning”. 
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